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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ENVIRONMENT-Air Pollution Control Districtof Jefferson County,
Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th

Cir. 1984), U.S.L.W. 2054 (July 10, 1984).

Jefferson County, Kentucky petitioned the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for the abatement of sulfur dioxide emissions from a power
plant across the Ohio River in Indiana. The county claimed that the plant
violated Clean Air Act provisions prohibiting emissions in one state which
prevent the attainment or maintenance of national air quality standards
in another state. Jefferson County claimed that Kentucky had established
air quality standards more stringent than national standards in order to
create a margin for future growth in the area. The county argued that the
emissions from the Indiana plant effectively stole this margin for growth.
The EPA rejected the county's position. The EPA ruled that it is irrelevant whether the Indiana plant infringes upon the margin needed for
the county's future industrial development. It found that the Act prohibits
interstate pollution only insofar as it prevents another state from attaining
or maintaining nationalair quality standards. The EPA further found that
the emissions from the Indiana plant did not prevent the maintenance of
such standards.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the EPA's ruling as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The court recognized that the Act does
not specify how much pollution may spill into another state before the
EPA's enforcement mechanism is triggered. The court held that the Act
was intended to apply to interstate emissions which "significantly contribute" to excessive pollution levels in the complaining state. Because
the EPA found that the emissions from the Indiana plant did not substantially contribute to a violation in Jefferson County, the abatement
provisions did not apply.

ENVIRONMENT-Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company,
-,

-

U.S.

104 S. Ct. 2862 (June 26, 1984).

The Monsanto Company brought an action in United States District
Court to enjoin the implementation or enforcement of certain provisions
of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Monsanto argued that the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of the Act were unconstitutional under the fifth amendment.
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Under FIFRA, applicants for pesticide registration must provide the
EPA with extensive data so that the agency can determine any possible
adverse environmental effects. The Act authorizes the EPA to use the data
submitted by applicants in evaluating subsequent applications. The EPA
also may publicly disclose health, safety, and environmental information
other than data on new active ingredients. The preparation of the registration data is expensive and time-consuming. The subsequent applicants
save a great deal in preparation costs by using the data of the original
applicant. The data is also valuable because of the possible trade secrets
and formulas which may be contained therein. The Act provides that
applicants who rely on data submitted by a previous applicant must compensate that applicant. The Act further establishes a mandatory arbitration
procedure to apply when the applicants cannot agree on the amount of
compensation due.
Monsanto argued that the challenged provisions of the Act effected a
"taking" of property without compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. It also argued that the provisions of the Act violated the fifth
amendment because the "taking" was for a private, rather than a public,
purpose. The district court agreed with Monsanto on both points. It found
the challenged provisions of the Act unconstitutional and permanently
enjoined the EPA from applying those provisions.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.
The Court conceded that trade secrets, though intangible, may constitute
property interests protected by the fifth amendment. The Court, however,
held that the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of the Act
do not effect a "taking" of these property interests. With the possible
exception of data submitted during the period between 1972 and 1978,
the submitters of data could have no reasonable investment-backed expectation that the information would remain confidential. When Monsanto
submitted the registration data, it was on notice of the conditions under
which the EPA was authorized to use and disclose the submitted data.
The company was unaware that the EPA could reveal much of the health,
safety, and efficiency data at any time necessary to carry out EPA duties
under FIFRA. As long as these conditions are rationally related to a
legitimate government objective, the submission of the data in exchange
for the privilege of registration is not a "taking."
The Court held that the challenged provisions may effect a "taking"
of the company's property interests with respect to data submitted during
the period between 1972 and 1978. Under the statutory scheme then in
effect, the applicant was allowed to protect some trade secret information
from disclosure. If the EPA were now to disclose this information or use
it in evaluating subsequent applications, the original applicant's reasonable investment-backed expectations would be frustrated. The Court held
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that this would constitute a taking only if the arbitration procedures in
the Act did not provide adequate compensation for the loss in market
value suffered because of the disclosure.
The Court further ruled that any taking of private property that may
occur through the EPA's use or disclosure of the data is a taking for a
public use. Even though private parties may benefit from the challenged
provisions of the Act, these provisions were primarily intended for the
good of the general public. Moreover, the purposes of protecting public
safety and promoting competitiveness within the industry are well within
Congressional police powers.
ENVIRONMENT-United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 53
U.S.L.W. 2109 (3d Cir., Aug. 15, 1984).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) attempted to criminally
prosecute a truck repair company and two of its employees whom federal
agents saw illegally dumping toxic chemicals into a trench that emptied
into navigable waters. The company pleaded guilty to violation of the
criminal provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
which sanctions any person who knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of
any hazardous waste without an EPA permit. The individual defendants,
however, argued that the RCRA criminal provision applies only to "owners and operators" and not to employees like the defendants who are not
responsible for obtaining a permit.
The court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument, holding them
subject to criminal prosecution under the Act. The court found that the
statute was broadly written in order to protect the public health and should
be construed to effectuate such purpose. In order to convict, however,
the EPA is required to show that each defendant knew that the corporation
was required to have a permit and was aware that the corporation did not
have such a permit. In some instances, this knowledge may be inferred
from the defendant's position in the company and other relevant circumstances.
LAND MANGEMENT--County of Skamania v. Washington, 102
Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 576 (June 28, 1984).
The Washington Supreme Court held unconstitutional the state's Forest
Products Industry Recovery Act of 1982 because the Act violated the
state's fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries. The invalidated statute dealt
with contracts for the sale of timber on lands held in trust for public
schools, the University of Washington, and others. The trust was established by the Washington Enabling Act and Article 16 of the Washington
constitution.
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Pursuant to its trust responsibility, the state Department of Natural
Resources sold to private companies at public auction the right to cut
timber from the trust lands. These timber sales were intended to generate
income for the school trust. The contracts generally provided that the
company would cut timber from the lands within two to three years, and
would pay a price based upon the anticipated price of lumber at the time
of harvest. The companies were also required to post a small performance
bond and a 10 percent deposit. The contracts were similar to futures
contracts as the state bore the risk of rising prices, and the company bore
the risk of falling prices.
The contracts were entered into in 1978 and 1979. The prices bid by
the companies reflected an anticipated upswing in the economy and a
resulting rise in housing starts and timber prices. When the opposite
happened and timber prices plummeted, the timber companies faced large
economic losses. Many companies threatened default and/or bankruptcy.
The legislature responded with the Forest Products Industry Recovery
Act of 1982. The Act permitted companies to terminate their contracts
by paying a $2,500 administration fee and forfeiting their initial 10 percent
deposit. The companies also were allowed to obtain an extension to the
contract by harvesting or beginning to harvest a portion of their contract
timber. The trial court found that the Act released over $90 million in
contract rights which the companies were obligated to perform and that
the state received very little, if anything, in return. The court ruled the
Act breached the state's fiduciary duties to the trust beneficiaries, in
violation of the state constitution.
The state supreme court upheld the trial court's decision. The court
ruled that federal land grant trusts are enforceable and impose upon the
state the same fiduciary duties applicable to private trustees. These duties
require the state to seek full market value of any asset of the trust which
is transferred out of the trust, including contract rights. In pursuing any
other objective, legitimate or otherwise, the state may not sacrifice the
beneficiaries' interests. The court held that the primary objective of the
Act, however, was to benefit the timber industry and the state economy
in general. The Act thus constituted a breach of the state's duty of undivided loyalty to the trust and resulted in a failure to manage prudently
the trust assets.
WATER-United States v. Anderson, - F.2d -, 11 Indian L. Rep.
2136 (9th Cir., July 10, 1984) (nos. 82-3597, 82-3625).
The federal government initiated this water rights adjudication in the
Chamokane Basin in Washington, including the rights of the Spokane
Indian Reservation. The adjudication was complicated by the fact that
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the reservation lands include parcels which were removed through allotment or homesteading and subsequently repurchased by the tribe and
returned to trust status. The Spokane Tribe argued it was entitled to its
full Winters rights with a priority date as of the date of the creation of
the reservation. Additionally, the tribe challenged the State of Washington's assertion of jurisdiction over the use of water by non-Indians on
the non-Indian land within the reservation.
The court of appeals held that the tribal water rights on land reacquired
following allotment and sale to non-Indians retained a priority date as of
the creation of the reservation. The court reasoned that when title to
allotted lands passed to a non-Indian, the appurtenant right to share in
the tribal reserved waters passed with it. This ensured that the Indian
allottee got his full benefit from the allotted land. The allotted lands,
therefore, retained their original priority date when returned to tribal
ownership. The court noted, however, that these rights may have been
lost in the interim through non-use by the non-Indian landowners. The
lands reacquired after homesteading are entitled to reserved water rights
but with a priority date as of reacquisition. The land removed from the
reservation through homesteading never acquired federal water rights and
must, therefore, acquire priority through state law in accord with existing
rights.
The court further held that, in the absence of federal preemption, the
state has jurisdiction over the use of water by non-Indian landholders
within the reservation. In distinguishing earlier Ninth Circuit precedent,
the court considered significant the fact that the Chamokane Basin arises
and continues for much of its length outside of the reservation. The court
found that the state's interest in developing a comprehensive water program for the basin weighed heavily in favor of permitting state regulatory
jurisdiction in the area. It stated that the state's exercise of jurisdiction
will not infringe on the tribal right to self-government or affect the tribe's
economic welfare because the tribe's water rights have been quantified
and will be protected by the federal water master.

